

**NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE LECTURE
3 February 1956**

**ASSESSMENT OF COMMUNIST SUCCESSES, PROBLEMS
AND PROSPECTS**

1. Basic Considerations.

- (a) No change in Soviet objectives, tactical variations within traditional Communist zig-zag theory Lenin-Stalin. Policy makers must avoid being deceived by temporary variations Soviet policy.
- (b) No change likely as long as present leadership and present system remains in Kremlin. Obviously problem of our own popular opinion remains and we must avoid impression of warlike posture, threats, etc.
- (c) They must demonstrate performance not promises.
- (d) Continued massive military build up as threat to hold over the neutralists and as deterrent to U.S.A. and allies.
- (e) Despite lip service to raising living standard and consumers goods, they will continue to devote as now some 35 per cent of their gross national production to capital investment largely adapted to military end items.

- (f) Whereas industrial output in 1950 roughly 1/5th of USA, it is projected under their 5 year plan to be about 2/5ths in 1960.
- (g) New 5 year plan provides for the tripling or quadrupling of items in the electronic field and a sixfold increase of production of separate heat resistance alloys, pointing up emphasis on items for guided missiles, jet engines, aircraft, etc.
- (h) In steel, their 1955 production rose to 45 million metric tons (against 106 for USA), and in primary aluminium to 500,000 metric tons (as against 1.4 million for USA). (Look at contrast in automobiles and trucks where their production 1/20th of ours, washing machines 1/50th, and radio and TV sets where they are about 1/5th of ours for a population 1/4th greater.)
- (i) Making substantial strides in critical military fields:
 - (1) Nuclear.
 - (2) Jet and long range aircraft.
 - (3) Guided missiles.

(j) Policy dominated for immediate future by determination to avoid risk of major war.

(k) At present state of their nuclear, aircraft and missile development, do not wish risk danger of massive nuclear retaliation, hence will avoid risky adventures. Consider themselves encircled by our overseas bases and undermining of these bases will be main element of their policy.

2. Balance Sheet.

- (a) With this background of basic elements of Soviet policy, let us draw a balance sheet of Soviet policy over the past decade.
- (b) Where do we stand in the Cold War struggle.
- (c) USA really first aroused to magnitude and nature of Communist threat period beginning 1946-47 and started to react.
- (d) Have gone through two phases and now entering a third phase of Soviet Cold War techniques.

(c) The first phase started with following events:

- (1) Greece threatened with Communist take-over from mid 1946 on. Iran and Turkey threatened with aggression.**
- (2) European economy drifting toward chaos early 1947 on.**
- (3) Czechoslovakia fell to Communism February 1948.**
- (4) Communist threatened take over Italy in April 1948 elections.**
- (5) Berlin blockade started June 1948.**
- (6) China Mainland threatened with Communist conquest by mid-1947 and lost by October 1949 (fall of Nanking, April 1949).**
Cumulative effect these developments. Stunned government.

3. The First Answer:

- (a) Aid to Greece and Turkey started April 1947 - (U S).
- (b) Commies ousted from French and Italian governments in May 1947.
- (c) Marshall plan and NATO. (Voted April 1948, emergency aid December 1947).
- (d) Italian elections won by anti-Commies. (April 1948).
- (e) Berlin airlift. (July 1948).
- (f) By mid-1949 had responded with reasonable success to various Soviet thrusts in Europe. But, China lost with impact on Indochina.

4. The Second Threat.

(a) Repulsed in European efforts to extend direct Soviet control by end 1950, and perhaps encouraged by their first A-bomb test (September 1949), and China success, the Soviets turned to military aggression by proxy, through their satellites.

(1) Korea.

(2) Indochina.

(b) In 1950-51, Viet Minh, having only little Chinese or Soviet aid, were repulsed by de Lattre.

(c) In 1952 and 1953, Chinese Communist aid was stepped up, Dien Bien Phu invested in December, lost April 1954.

5. The Second Answer. (To open aggression).

- (a) Communist blocked but not defeated in Korea.
- (b) In Indochina, saved what was salvageable without war, and worked to build up a Diem government.
- (c) Start toward bringing Germany into NATO and rearming.
- (d) SEATO and coalition in SEA.
- (e) Baghdad Pact.
- (f) Congressional resolution re Defense Formosa (Quemoy and Matsu).
- (g) Mossadegh - overthrown in Iran.
- (h) Arbenz driven from Guatemala.

On balance West fared well. (For example 1 1/4 million East Germans fled from their "paradise" since 1949 -- now nearly 1000 day).

6. The Third Threat (And the Answer).

- (a) Peace and Blight (Ruble, Rifle and Rice) - arming the trouble makers - economic penetration - appeal to neutrals - Little Red Riding Hood.
- (b) Said due Stalin's demise (February 1953) - "post hoc ergo propter hoc" fallacy.
- (c) Typical Commie strategy - retreat, regroup and attack on new front Lenin's policy ZIG-ZAG. Soviets don't want war now - had come to verge in Korea and Indochina.
- (d) Wanted new policy so subtle no danger of war involvement. Really frightened at trend. Chose soft "underbelly" of Asia - From Syria to Siam.

(e) Their Smoke Screen (Retreat) Because their bluff called.

- (1) Geneva. (We weren't caught napping - but how could you refuse without playing their game).
- (2) Austrian peace. (First Sov held territory given up).
- (3) Swallowed threats about January rearming and joining NATO.
- (4) Communist China temporarily halted attack on off-shore islands.
- (5) Settled for half-a-loaf in Indochina.

(f) Asian Underbelly Policy:

- (1) Appeal to former "Colonial" or recently free areas - Arab World, India, Burma, Afgans, etc.
- (2) Economic aid.
- (3) Military aid where it will cause trouble
(Egypt - Israel)
(Their excess of military equipment -- MIG-15, IL-28
Tanks, old subs, etc.)
Merchants of Death on a Grand Scale.
Use of Satellites - Czechoslovakia, Poland, etc.

(g) Scale - some half billion promised and good bit in pipe line -

Some 200 million of arms to Egypt - 100 million steel mills

for India - 100 million credit for Afghans (22 years - withdraw annually).

Buying Burma rice, etc. (Real cost not great).

(h) Discuss subtlety and appeal of new look.

(i) Read memo on reasons for Commie appeal.

7. The Answer to Third Threat (In the Making).

The New Yorker Cartoon.

Must tackle this problem as we tackled Europe collapse in 1947-48 with Marshall Plan. But in this case great outpouring of money not the answer.

8. While concentrating their major drive on Middle East, South and Southeast Asia, Commies are not neglecting Europe and Far East.

- (a) In Europe encouraged by French elections (explain) and by the prospect of upcoming Italian elections. Despite some troubled areas in Satellites, consider their basic hold there to be secure. While same true in East Germany, have a worrying situation if East Germany gains more independence and its own military force.
- (b) In Far East, desire hold Communist China back from adventuresome activities that might bring war. Do not object to their keeping up the pressure and feel that Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Malaya, Indonesia, etc. present likely targets.

9. Over-all Summation.

Popular impression fed by columnists and prophets of gloom not borne out by calm appraisal. They are not winning the Cold War, but they are not losing it and still see prospects ahead for their new line of policy.

10. But they too have their problems. (Recall Nazi situation).

(a) Question of Kremlin leadership - how long can Committee form last. Khrushchev seems to be consolidating his hold .

(Mention Kruglov, etc.).

(b) The agricultural problem.

(c) Hanging to and controlling satellite areas and China.

(d) Keeping their people under control without really improving living standards for effect of their "open door" policy to visiting delegations.

(e) How to maintain iron discipline and State direction with vast expansion of education - scientific training, etc.

11. Conclusions.

No reason to be panicky. No evidence that popular support for Communist form of government has increased over past year in any important areas, though still some soft spots. Their promising program is "making hay," but will their performance equal expectations.